Contents:
Above the targets, the pilots found bad weather.
As a result, they achieved only four hits on eight attempts. The weather was so poor that the pilots only managed two hits on 18 attempts. Clouds obscured many first targets, leading to nine no drops. As a result, most pilots attempted to drop both bombs on alternate targets.
Most missed. Once again, weather conditions limited pilot success as they scored seven hits with seven misses. This time the weather cleared up enough to permit a much higher degree of success: ten hits in 13 attempts. Stealth Fighter pilots achieved ten hits on 14 attempts.
One jet ground aborted. A combination of poor weather, unreliable aircraft systems and target acquisition errors attributed to 14 missed targets of 21 attempted. Two air aborts reduced the wave to an even dozen Stealth Fighters. Of 23 targets attacked, the squadron pilots registered 20 hits and three misses. Stealth pilots scored 21 hits on the airfield and one hit on an alternate target. Only four bombs missed their targets.
Insufficient time for mission planning and photographic support, however, caused the unit to drop four sorties. The remaining ten aircraft took off on time at midnight to bomb missile handling facilities, the main signals intelligence station, and transportation facilities in Baghdadi a very important person VIP residence at Abu Ai Jahish; highway bridges over the Euphrates River at An Nasiriyah and As Samawah and a highway bridge at Ai Quanah.
The TFS pilots hit on 16 of 18 attempts. One aircraft aborted after takeoff due to a lack of tanker support; however, the other 13 jets scored 20 hits with five misses. The squadron dropped 20 bombs, scoring 14 direct hits and six misses. On these targets, the pilots scored five hits, three misses, and five no drops due to bad weather. These aircraft were assigned to the TFS for maintenance and management.
Their relative success reflected eight hits, three misses, and five no drops for weather. This raid proved largely ineffective as three FAs air aborted and attacks by the other seven produced only eight hits with and six misses. The Qayyarah West Airfield went unscathed due to bad target weather, but the alternate target at Al Assad bore the brunt of seven direct hits.
Kirkuk Airfield also quaked under the force of eight bomb strikes. Al Muhammad Airfield took three direct hits while the Kirkuk ground control site and sector headquarters were rocked by one each. Six TFS and four TFS FAs took part in the attacks scoring nine hits on 18 tries while suffering one air abort, four bomb failures, and five misses. Stealth pilots scored 13 hits in 18 attempts. Twenty four of 26 bombs found their targets. The ten jets bombed their assigned targets with much success, scoring on 16 out of 20 attempts. These aircraft, except for two jets that air aborted, hit various missile and communications facilities at Baghdad, An Nasiriyah, Ad Diwamiyah, and Ar Rutbah; hardened shelters at Rasheed Airfield; and the Presidential grounds at Abu Ghurayb.
Stealth pilots enjoyed a high margin of success, hitting 15 targets and missing only one. A review of FA target tapes revealed 17 hits and seven misses. All ten FAs took off as scheduled, but due to an air abort only nine jets reached their targets. Objectives for the wave included Rasheed airfield, chemical and biological warfare facilities at Salmon Pak, the Republican Guard Headquarters in Baghdad, the Abu Ghurayb biological warfare facility, and ammunition bunkers at Karbala, Fallujah, and Baghdad.
Stealth pilots scored 15 hits and two misses. A few hours later, the Stealth Fighters arrived over their prospective targets only to find most obscured by foul weather. Nevertheless, alternate targeting enabled the pilots to strike heavy blows on highway bridges at Al Kifl, Ar Ramadi and Al Fifl; an ammunition depot at Karbala; and a fiber optics bridge at Al Jamahiriya.
Iraq declared that shells filled with mustard had been "lost" shortly after the Gulf War. Commanding Gen. Retrieved 15 December Used as a storage area for some items under on-going verification Most buildings damaged or destroyed during the war. Some components said to be produced under the J-1 programme were also shown to inspectors. Imported missile main fuel TM : Iraq declared the importation of tonnes of main fuel. Stealth pilots hit 13 targets on 23 attempts.
Fourteen of 20 bombs found their mark. One aircraft ground aborted.
1. The Advance of British-Iraqi Army UntilKut Al Amara Siege. At the outset of World he could cross only soldiers to the opposite bank in one night, and in Air support gave Kut Al Amara only four extra days to stand, but this effort was. During your deployment to Iraq as a member of the Big Red One team, you should be aware Al Kut. Babil. Al Hillah. As Sulaymaniyah. As Sulaymaniyah. Population: Isra' and Miraj: Night the Prophet Muhammad journeyed from Mecca to Jerusalem and then customary for an Arab person to stand about one foot away.
Strike reports reflected four hits, five misses, and nine no drops. Pilots were again plagued by bad weather and managed only nine hits in 14 attempts. The Stealth pilots struck cleanly on 16 of 28 attempts. These aircraft achieved 11 hits in 12 tries. Two bombs were not dropped due to inclement weather. Stealth pilots hit 13 targets on 23 attempts. In this strike, Stealth pilots achieved 18 hits and missed only once.
One of, the two air aborted, but the other scored two for two against the depot. Stealth pilots scored 11 hits on 13 attempts.
Eleven additional drops cancelled due to bad weather. Bad weather limited attack results to 17 hits mostly on secondary targets and six misses. Stealth pilots attacked chemical warfare bunkers at Samarraand Habbaniyah; a bridge at Ar Ramadi; and unspecified airfield alternate targets.
Eight hits, seven misses, and nine no drops evidenced the poor weather wing pilots faced in most target areas. The pilots successfully dropped 14 bombs on target; four others missed. Additional tasking featured hits on the Ministry of Defense, Air Force, and Intelligence Service Headquarters in Baghdad; military related facilities in North Taji; a biological warfare facility at Abu Ghurayb; and a chemical warfare facility at Habbaniyah.
Thirteen jets posted 19 hits and five targets missed. Independent operations on the part of the TFS squadron featured strikes on the short-range ballistic missile assembly plant in Baghdad and the Presidential grounds at Abu Ghurayb. Bombing results reflected 16 hits and four misses.
Both squadrons mounted attacks on the steel fabrication plant at Taji. The Commission's verification has subsequently focussed on the following main tasks: the accounting of all proscribed missiles and related operational missile assets, including missile launchers, warheads and propellants in particular those declared as destroyed unilaterally;.
This required additional actions by the Commission to dispose of proscribed items, identified through the verification process, as well as new declarations to be presented by Iraq. In August , Iraq admitted that important information on its proscribed programmes had been hidden from the Commission including a considerable amount of documentation.
Such an official declaration was provided by Iraq in November The Commission did not accept this declaration as either a full or complete disclosure. In June , Iraq and the Commission established a Joint Programme of Action and agreed to concentrate work on certain fundamental areas. The first priority among them was the material balance of proscribed weapons and their major components.
The other established priorities were: the unilateral destruction of proscribed items; further provision of documentation, when available, related to proscribed weapons programmes; and the identification of measures taken in and the measures used by certain individuals to retain some proscribed items until August This paper provides, in broad terms, information on the current status of the material balances of proscribed operational weapons and capabilities in the missile area. This approach has been designed to allow the Commission to reconcile, in a reasonable but verifiable manner, the quantities and the types of proscribed weapons and their major parts, acquired by Iraq either through production or importation, with the quantities of these items disposed of through consumption or destruction or rendering harmless.
The methodology adopted in this paper, is to indicate, based on the most recent declarations from Iraq, quantities of proscribed items available to Iraq, and then provide factual statements as to how the declared quantities have been accounted for. Where feasible, the data is presented in a tabular format for ease of comprehension.
The paper also provides a report on the status of missile repair and production facilities which were required to be destroyed or rendered harmless under resolution Beyond the material balances related to proscribed missiles and the status of relevant facilities, the paper does not address other issues that were investigated by the Commission and which may or may not have reached a satisfactory resolution. Section 1 of the paper provides a status report of the material balances of proscribed missiles and related operational assets.
Section 2 describes the status of the material balances of proscribed indigenous missiles, their related major parts, production equipment, and the status of missile repair and production facilities.
Section 3 summarises missile activities in Iraq after the adoption of resolution relevant to the verification of its proscribed activities. Section 1: "Status of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets". For the purpose of the verification of the material balance of proscribed missiles and related operational assets, the Commission has focussed on the following key items: the missiles as well as their launchers, warheads and single-use propellants for proscribed missiles.
The Commission has also investigated the accounting for other elements of operational assets such as key missile guidance and control instruments and auxiliary vehicles for missile fuelling, transportation and testing. The Commission has determined that the full accounting of these latter elements, despite remaining ambiguities, could be considered secondary in importance, provided a solid and verifiable accounting of the selected key items is established.
Iraq declared that it imported long-range combat missiles that fall under prohibitions established by resolution Over half of them were modified by Iraq, since , into missiles known in Iraq as Al Hussein class missiles. Al Hussein missiles used by Iraq during recent wars had a range of some kilometres. The data on the missile deliveries, serial numbers of missile engines and other components that was provided to the Commission by the supplier, was essential in establishing the material balance in this area. Table 1 provides a summary of the material balance of the proscribed combat missiles imported by Iraq.
Expenditure during the Iran-Iraq war , including the War of the Cities in February-April Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq.
Unilateral destruction by Iraq mid July and October 85 Accounting is based on documentation provided by Iraq. The Commission carried out laboratory analysis of remnants of the unilaterally destroyed missiles excavated in The Commission identified remnants of engines from 83 out of the 85 missiles declared. As a result of the emergency session of the Special Commission on 21 November , the members of the Commission stated that they were "satisfied that of the proscribed missiles imported by Iraq have been effectively accounted for".
In late , Iraq provided to the Commission an inventory of missiles destroyed unilaterally. This inventory contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles, in addition to the 85 imported missiles.
The November emergency session determined that accounting for these seven missiles was one of the priority requirements. The Commission has not been able to verify the nature and destruction of these missiles.
For more details, see Section 2, below. In July , the Commission supervised the destruction of 9 Fahad missiles. Twenty-one flight tests of Fahad missiles were declared to have been conducted by Iraq before the Gulf War. No supporting documentation has been provided by Iraq to ascertain how many such missiles were modified.
Unmodified Volga missiles declared by Iraq in are currently under the Commission's monitoring in order to ensure their non-modification for a surface-to-surface application or for delivery of non-conventional warheads. Iraq declared that, during the Gulf War, it had 14 combat mobile launchers for Al Hussein class missiles, including ten which had been imported and four which were indigenously produced.