Dating valley El Obeid Sudan
The humanitarian operation comes under the U. Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan based in Khartoum. He is assisted by two deputy humanitarian coordinators; one in Khartoum, for operationsin government-held territory; and one in Nairobi, for operations in rebel-controlled territory. OLS in the south is a consortiumof six operational U. It is headquartered in Khartoum and the southern sector is headquartered in Nairobi.
The only official entry point by air is from Lokichokkio , Kenya. It held Both forces had been cooperating with and receiving material and logistical support from the government long before signing of this political charter. The location, quantity, and grade of the energy source are usually considered to be well established in such reserves. The group includes companies operating in more than countries and engaged in the core businesses of exploration and production, oil products, chemicals, downstream gas and power, and renewables.
Shell participated as a junior partner in Chevron's oil operations in Sudan in the early s. It has offices in Sudan for storage bunkers and seafreight, and for marketing and chemicals. As of , it agreed that it would not sell aviation fuel to the Sudanese army. Located in Lui, Eastern Equatoria. It remains the largest rebel group in Sudan. It joined the government in under the Khartoum Peace Agreement. Prior usage : The group that split, under Cmdr. After , it was headed by Brig. Gatluak Deng removed in late and then by Maj. Led by Cmdr.
Riek Machar, Cmdr. Gordon Kong and Cmdr. It was dependent on clandestine military supplies and cooperation from the Khartoum government. In April it signed a political charter and in April a peace agreement with the government. It described itself as a regional Upper Nile grouping, cooperating with all forces fighting the government for self determination for the south. In July it signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government. Paulino Matiep from his Bul Nuer constituency in March ; always a government ally.
Went into partnership with Arakis Energy to develop the oil fields and was bought out by Arakis.
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It owns 10 percent of and is co-lead partner on Block 5B with Petronas. Sudd was derived from the Arabic word sadd meaning barrier or obstacle. Today it is used to describe the permanent swamp of the Nile or, more loosely, the whole Nile flood-plain, including the seasonal wetlands as well as the permanent swamp. Talisman was spun off from British Petroleum and is now one of Canada's largest corporations. They are exposed late in the dry season as the floodwaters recede and provide excellent pastureland. It operates in more than countries.
In Total of France gained the concession for Block 5 , square kilometers in the Bor, Pibor and Kapoeta districts of southern Sudan. In Total allied with PetroFina to be the fifth largest oil company in the world, called TotalFina. In it merged with Elf-Acquitaine to become the fourth largest oil company in the world, TotalFinaElf.
Its Block 5 concession in southern Sudan, which it reduced to about , square kilometers, has not been developed, due to the war. Block 5 is the largest oil concession in Sudan. It registered with the government as a political association in It declared the Khartoum Peace Agreement dismantled by Sudan government actions and delinked itself from that government, pledging to be responsible to a political body to be formed after adequate consultation among the political cadres of Upper Nile the SSLM. It dissolved after Riek Machar defected from the Sudanese government in early One of the two largest parties in Sudan during democratic times, it was part of the NDA in but withdrew in and its leadership returned to Sudan from exile to operate as a political party.
Its leader, Sadiq al Mahdi, was prime minister twice.
El-Obeid also romanized as Al-Ubayyid, is the capital of the state of North Kurdufan, in Sudan. Contents. 1 Overview and history; 2 Climate; 3 Sports; 4 Religion. Al-Ubayyiḍ, also spelled El-Obeid, town, south-central Sudan. It lies on a sandy, scrub-covered plateau at an elevation of 1, feet (
Agency Appeal for Sudan An annual joint appeal by U. In it issued a statement condemning the oil companies operating in Unity state and called on the government to suspend immediately all oil operations there. World Relief Corp. The first export of crude oil from Sudan in August marked a turning point in the country's complex civil war, now in its twentieth year: oil became the main objective and a principal cause of the war. Oil now figures as an important remaining obstacle to a lasting peace and oil revenues have been used by the government to obtain weapons and ammunition that have enabled it to intensify the war and expand oil development.
Expansion of oil development has continued to be accompanied by the violent displacement of the agro-pastoral southern Nuer and Dinka people from their traditional lands atop the oilfields. Members of such communities continue to be killed or maimed, their homes and crops burned, and their grains and cattle looted. The large-scale exploitation of oil by foreign companies operating in the theatre of war in southern Sudan has increased human rights abuses there and has exacerbated the long-running conflict in Sudan, a conflict marked already by gross human rights abuses-two million dead, four million displaced since and recurring famine and epidemics.
Forced displacement of the civilian population, and the death and destruction that have accompanied it, are the central human rights issues relating to oil development in Sudan. The government is directly responsible for this forced displacement, which it has undertaken to provide security to the operations of its partners, the international and mostly foreign state-owned oil companies.
But the Sudanese government itself has helped to create the threat by forging ahead with oil development in southern territory under circumstances in which its residents have no right to participate in their own governance nor share the benefits of oil development. Brute force has been a key component of the government's oil development strategy.
Map B. In the s the government embarked upon a more sophisticated displacement campaign, through the use of divide-and-conquer tactics: it bought off rebel factions and exacerbated south-south ethnic differences with arms supplies. Campaigns of killing, pillage, and burning, enabled by government troops and air support for their southern allies who served as front troops, cleared the way for Western and Asian oil corporations to develop the basic infrastructure for oil extraction and transportation: rigs, roads, pumping stations, and pipelines.
The availability of the means of transport of oil to the market makes the nearest undeveloped block economically viable. The agro-pastoralists living there then become the target of forced displacement. Since , when the pipeline was nearing completion and Blocks 1, 2, and 4 came on line with ,, then , barrels of crude oil produced daily, the main military theatre has been in the adjacent Block 5A. Oil revenues enable the government to increase its military hardware: it tripled its fleet of attack helicopters in with the purchase abroad of twelve new helicopters-used to deadly effect in the killing of twenty-four civilians at a relief food distribution site in early , to cite only one example.
In a number of cases, international oil companies in Sudan have denied that any abuses were taking place in connection with oil exploration and production. Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, oil company executives have claimed that they were unaware of any uncompensated forced displacement as a result of oil operations. They have also claimed to have undertaken investigations establishing that abuses are minimal or nonexistent.
As noted below, such efforts do not stand up to scrutiny. Increasingly, under pressure from nongovernmental organizations NGOs and some concerned governments, oil company representatives have claimed instead that they are playing a positive role in difficult circumstances to monitor and rein in abuses. As detailed below, such claims have consistently been self-serving.
Human Rights Watch believes that oil companies in Sudan, seeking to make a profit in areas of the country wracked by civil war and often brutally cleared of indigenous peoples, have an obligation to see that rights abuses connected with oil production cease.
This report is about the human cost of the oil-and corporate complicity in the Sudanese government's human rights abuses, including its policy of sponsored ethnic conflict and forced displacement to clear tens of thousands of southern Sudanese from their homes atop the oilfields. The first part of this report describes early developments in the oil sector in Sudan, summarizing the experience of Chevron beginning in and Arakis beginning in in Blocks 1, 2, and 4.
Part one also details the historical evidence that, contrary to oil company and Sudanese government assertions, southern Sudanese had long lived in the oilfields, and were displaced as a result of the oil operations. The second part of the report covers oil development by Lundin IPC in Block 5A starting in and the role of Talisman Energy starting in in continued development of Blocks 1, 2, and 4, examining the large-scale displacement that continued to accompany oil development and intensified civil war in the region. The third part of the report provides a detailed account of the human rights consequences of oil development in Sudan, including population displacement, ethnic manipulation, aerial bombings of civilians, property destruction, waste, and, especially for many Nuer and Dinka, human misery and despair.
The fourth part considers what oil company representatives knew and the extent of their complicity, and their governments' all too common preference for business as usual over policies aimed at ending abuses. According to information provided by the United Nations U. Numbers are at most estimates, and hard to come by, but the displacement continues as of the writing of this report, in spasms of military attacks by government army forces and Nuer militia or armed groups, as they now prefer to be called , joined in by militia of the Baggara tribes to the northwest.
This count did not include many others who fled to areas inaccessible to the U. This is a conservative estimate as it does not include the oilfield displaced that went to other parts of Bahr El Ghazal or to Khartoum.
Cholera is a risk in parts of this country. In the Mahdi's son had the mosque and tomb rebuilt. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever is a viral disease that typically causes fever, bleeding under the skin, and pain. The island is situated 58km south of Port Sudan and was once a major trading centre, particularly in the 19th century. Its expansion to accommodate a rapidly-growing population, however, has added very little in terms of charm or atmosphere. There is currently a risk of chikungunya in this country.
The displacement has continued in sporadic surges of tens of thousands ever since. The Nuer and Dinka people, members of the two largest ethnic groups in the south, have borne the brunt of the war in their home territories, through war-caused displacement, death, disease, dislocation, asset destruction, and recurring famine. The year saw a significant escalation of conflict and displacement, shortly after the Canadian company Talisman Energy Inc. In mid-May , the Sudanese government launched an all-out attack lasting several weeks on Dinka communities in the eastern part of Block 1.
The assault commenced with aerial bombardment, followed by ground troops who looted freely and burned everything. Tens of thousands of people were displaced. The completion of the pipeline from Block 1 to the Red Sea in May meant that Block 5A became commercially viable in a way it had not been before. A government offensive into the block followed ineluctably.
Risk Levels
Survivors described to Human Rights Watch the exodus of Nuer civilians being chased by pro-government militia from Block 5A's oilfields in late The displaced Nuer carried fishing spears, but most left behind even such basic necessities as kitchen spoons and cooking utensils. Some had a few implements and mosquito nets but they could not carry much because they were carrying their children.
They tried to save their cattle, their main asset, but those cattle that were too exhausted to keep up and straggled behind were attacked by lions. On the long walk through the wetlands to Makuac, in Dinka territory, "There was so much water on the way, and we were walking with children, that it took a week,"said a Nuer chief of Ler, who took part in the flight.
Sudan (UN Mission)
It stopped them from chasing us, and we kept walking through the rain. Small children died of cold on the way, and had to be left on the road. We drank the water from the road and toic. There were rivers with water lilies and fish; we ate both. These were not the only abuses. Boys were conscripted and women raped. One boy soldier forcibly inducted by Nuer pro-government militia said, "If they captured you and then took your sister as a wife [raped her], if you were angry, they would beat you.
They are serious about raping. She knew some of the girls who were abducted, including a young woman of her age-eighteen-who was taken with three girls from a village one hour away. This suffering has continued in the same pattern to date.
The government's dry season military activities in in Block 5A appeared designed precisely to capture land for, construct, and secure a road leading to Lundin's fields and the Sudanese army garrison at Ler. In the ensuing months of fighting, most of it between Nuer rebels opposing the government and the government's Nuer militias, tens of thousands of civilians in the Block 5A and adjacent Block 4 oil areas were uprooted. By July 28, , thousands of civilians were on the move from both the pro-government militias and the rebel forces. Relief workers in a plane flying over the fifty kilometers between Nimne and Nhialdiu in Block 5A saw few people, huts, or cattle, because a wide swathe of land, as far as they could see, had been burned to the ground.
Sudan (North)
Many civilians from the area fled or were driven west and north; many thousands were seen with their cattle and mats but no other possessions camped on the banks of the Jur River in late July Those who could manage to swim across with their cattle did so. A separate mass of up to 60, people made it to the relative safety of Bentiu, a garrison town. By early , the oil road south of Bentiu was heavily defended by military patrols and guard posts. While the oil companies said that civilians were living there and enjoying the road, the tens of thousands of people already displaced from there to other less militarized areas told an entirely different story-one of people forced from their land, their cattle stolen, homes and possessions destroyed by government agents without the least notice or compensation.
They were abandoned to the over-extended and under-funded international relief network, whose operations were the object of a government cat-and-mouse game in which a government "win" meant that the newly displaced were cut off from international aid altogether.