Dating over 40 near Kramatorsk Ukraine

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The MACD is below its signal line and negative. The configuration is negative. Moreover, the pair stands below its 20 and 50 MAs respectively at 1. Consolidation, The RSI shows downside momentum. Bullish bias above Bullish bias above 1. Under pressure, The RSI is capped by a declining trend line. Further advance, The RSI shows upside momentum. Rebound, A support base at 0.

Rebound, The RSI is mixed to bullish.

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Under pressure, As long as the resistance at 0. Continuation of the rebound, The RSI shows upside momentum. Rebound towards 1. The MACD is negative and above its signal line. Kyiv Post. Archived from the original on 3 May Retrieved 3 May Tasnim News Agency.

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Archived from the original on 29 June Retrieved 28 June Archived from the original on 28 April Archived from the original on 30 October Retrieved 15 May The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 25 April Archived from the original on 8 June Retrieved 30 April Daily Sabah. Archived from the original on 17 May Retrieved 16 May Macedonian International News Agency.

Retrieved 4 May NBC News. Retrieved 7 May Four people died". Archived from the original on 1 July Retrieved 1 July Ukrainska Pravda in Ukrainian. Archived from the original on 13 April Ukrainian Independent Information Agency. Archived from the original on 15 August Miller 25 April Ukrayinska Pravda in Ukrainian.

The Guardian. Ukraine after overnight assault killed 10 — self-defense". Archived from the original on 6 May Retrieved 5 May Archived from the original on 5 May Archived from the original on 9 September Low salaries in the statelets are a sore point, both for residents and their de facto leaders.

Average monthly salaries in the statelets also compare poorly with those across the line. Hide Footnote They did so in separate but nearly simultaneous and identical statements, suggesting coordination with the Kremlin.

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Experts and residents offered various explanations for the unpaid leave policy. Some argued that authorities wanted to hold on to all the qualified workers they could keep. Other contended that authorities sought to limit outside knowledge about the dire state of local industry. Hide Footnote With downsizing picking up speed in , and rumours of increasing harassment and imprisonment of those who strike for their wages, enlistment may become an increasingly attractive option.

Apart from joining with separatist forces, one can make decent money in the de facto civil services. Hide Footnote Among the former are many who may not have initially supported the separatist cause. Some claim that they stayed out of a sense of duty to their communities, and ended up trapped when they were blacklisted by Ukrainian security services or vigilante groups, meaning that they could not hope to relocate to government-controlled Ukraine without unpleasant run-ins with the law.

Hide Footnote Some are also banned from leaving by the de facto authorities themselves, who view them as potential carriers of state secrets.

In these cases, decent salaries sweeten what is otherwise a bad deal. The official retirement age for men in Ukraine is For women, it is Authorities acknowledge that these payments, officially known as financial assistance, not pensions, are below subsistence levels. Hide Footnote For the , people who receive these payments, this income is crucial.

Under Poroshenko, Kyiv took numerous steps to limit pension access for residents of the de facto republics. These include the aforementioned requirement that recipients formally reside in areas Kyiv controls, as well as regulations limiting the amount of back pay the state owes if pensions are cut off for an extended period.

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Today, the number of ostensibly eligible people from the separatist-held territories who lack access to their government pensions exceeds the number who receive them. Hide Footnote This number does not include those who have reached pension age since the conflict began. Hide Footnote Certainly, financing pensions creates a major funding challenge for Kyiv. Low legal retirement ages, and the large percentage of working-aged people employed in shadow economies, exacerbate the problem.

Hide Footnote The loss of tax revenue from workers residing in the statelets does not help. Hide Footnote The ministry made this pledge before the COVID outbreak, whose resulting restrictions have led to a spike in unemployment and a resulting drop in income taxes reaching the pension fund. Hide Footnote It follows that Kyiv is legally obligated to repay these debts in full. Doing so inevitably would increase the deficit substantially, but the World Bank and other international financial institutions may be able to help, as described below. Some nationalist activists and politicians have argued over the years that citizens living in the statelets should be cut off from their Ukrainian pensions entirely, suggesting that paying pensions reduces the financial burden on Russia and may benefit disloyal citizens.

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Crisis Group interviews, civil society activist, Shchastya, January ; military support volunteer, Mariupol, May ; members of leading parliamentary coalition, Kyiv, May Crisis Group interview, social policy ministry staff, September While both positions have a degree of validity, the human costs and reputational risks of not paying pensions outweigh the potential benefits of any savings — as Crisis Group has written previously.

Hide Footnote One household survey conducted in , after Kyiv had removed a large number of people from its pension rolls, found that a majority of the food-insecure cited reduced pension income as a major contributor to their difficulties. Hide Footnote Hardship has only increased as a result of pandemic-related traffic restrictions, which as discussed above meant that thousands of pensioners in the statelets could not get access to Ukrainian pension payments.

Hide Footnote As they see it, citizens who receive both Ukrainian and de facto statelet pensions will resist any resolution that deprives them of one or the other. Crisis Group interviews, Donetsk resident, Svyatohirsk, November This claim is at best an exaggeration.

True, recipients of dual pensions fare better than those receiving only de facto statelet pensions or the small number of IDPs residing in government-controlled areas who receive no pension at all. But this bar is low, and the idea that they benefit from the conflict is dubious.

Given the cost of cross-line travel and the small amount of de facto pensions, their spending power is roughly equivalent to that of pensioners in government-controlled areas.

Unlike the latter, however, they must expend considerable effort and face tremendous risk to get their money. According to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE monitors, eighteen people died of health-related causes while waiting to cross the front line between December and April alone. Hide Footnote Interviews with so-called pension tourists suggest that most feel the downside of their situation acutely. Dollar value reflects the hryvnia-to-dollar exchange rate at the time.

Human rights activists have warned for years that people who have had their Ukrainian pensions cut off could bring their cases to the European Court of Human Rights, and that the Court would almost certainly decide in their favour, while also potentially awarding damages at least in the low thousands of euros for each plaintiff. Hide Footnote While the approach avoids financial costs, at least for the time being, it further alienates the population living in the statelets. Poroshenko administration officials and their allies largely framed their support for pension restrictions in moral and political terms.

Reva said the report had taken his remarks out of context. The new government has taken a different view, however, with President Volodmyr Zelenskyy explicitly promising to expand pension access for residents of separatist-held areas. His ruling party filed draft legislation delinking pension eligibility from IDP status in fall Instead, they could cross when convenient to pick up pension payments. Soon after Zelenskyy assumed the presidency, Moscow made residents of the de facto republics eligible for fast-tracked Russian citizenship.

It later expanded eligibility to all of Donetsk and Luhansk, including parts under Ukrainian government control. Hide Footnote In Kyiv, some Zelenskyy critics argued that this step rendered any government humanitarian outreach to the de facto republics moot, as Russia was both ready to accept the people there and determined to make it more difficult for Ukraine to reintegrate them. Locals say very few pensioners are likely to take up this offer, as the potential benefits would not outweigh the sacrifice of leaving their homes. Hide Footnote For retired industrial workers, Russian citizenship would also mean forfeiting sizeable Ukrainian state pensions.

A vocal group of self-described pro-European and patriotic Ukrainians oppose reintegration of Donbas in the short to medium term. They see the prospect of reintegrated statelets as a Trojan horse for Russia sympathisers, which would undermine Ukraine for decades to come, if not forever. For a diaspora perspective, see Alexander J. Such an approach would not work.

This concern may be pressing for those who advocate putting off reintegration. Some of these people, whether due to painful wartime experiences or pre-existing prejudices, view the statelets as places where virtually nothing of cultural, economic, political or demographic value remains. Crisis Group observation, Svyatohirsk, November Stanislav Aseev, who suffered torture at the hands of DPR security services, was offered but turned down a role as Ukrainian government representative to the Minsk process in early Hide Footnote But allowing these sometimes embittered voices to guide national policy is a recipe for protracted conflict, further immiseration and deepening resentment — the fruits of which Ukraine would reap if and when reunification occurs.

Kyiv can and should aim higher. Its goals should be to ease humanitarian suffering and to shape the conditions on both sides of the line of separation in a way that would make reintegration both economically viable and politically palatable for residents throughout Donbas. In order to pursue these goals, it will ultimately have to help rebuild an economy that works for residents of both separatist- and government-held Donbas — a major and long-term undertaking that will almost certainly require outside help.

In order to make it feasible, Kyiv could take several steps, some relatively modest, to help get things moving in the right direction. To start with, Kyiv can throw an economic lifeline to the desperate pensioners living in separatist-controlled territory who have not been able to collect their Ukrainian pensions. Notably, the World Bank currently supports pension and social insurance programs in Ukraine, including some related to Donbas.

In June , the bank announced the first of two economic recovery loans to Ukraine, indicating that the second would strengthen pension benefits for the elderly. Secondly, Kyiv can take certain measures to build trust with those on the breakaway side of the line who worry that reintegration would spell legal peril.

While it may be premature for Kyiv to announce a full-blown transitional justice plan that would apply in the event of reintegration, it could at least pass legislation affirming its commitment to certain basic principles — including that it has no intention of proceeding legally against persons who have not been complicit in major transgressions eg, gross human rights abuses — in order to help quiet those concerns.

Thirdly, to begin fostering social and economic cohesion across the line of separation, Kyiv and the de facto republics, with Russian support, should encourage legal cross-line trade once pandemic restrictions are lifted. Ideally, a further easing of restrictions, to be negotiated in the Minsk format, atop the measures implemented in late would encourage small traders to move agricultural and other goods legally. De facto authorities have not facilitated this easing in the past, with the DPR, for example, retaining an kg limit on items shipped in from government-controlled territory, with lower maximum weights for specific food products, after Kyiv lifted its weight limitations on items going both ways.

Hide Footnote Yet they have good reason to cooperate: even if the easing produces benefits for Kyiv including by improving perceptions of it in the east , expanded access to affordable, high-quality Ukrainian goods in the statelets would provide relief to household budgets. Entrepreneurs on both sides of the line also stand to gain. Such steps should go hand in hand with improved cross-line freedom of movement for civilians. Greater mobility will be particularly salient in Luhansk oblast, where the planned addition of new motor crossings at both Zolote and Shchastya by 10 November will create important channels for trade and traffic over the line.

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